European Chief Prosecutor Laura Codruța Kövesi has put political independence at the centre of the debate about Hungary’s participation in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. In an interview published by Telex on 30 September, she discussed past obstacles to examining Hungarian politicians and the preparations for the country’s entry into the European prosecution system. Telex reported that the first investigation in Hungary could begin next year.
Kövesi visited Budapest for talks with government ministers and representatives of the Prosecutor General’s Office. The interview addressed relations with the previous government, future investigations and the proposed national body for recovering and protecting assets. Its central issue was whether prosecutors would be able to follow evidence when politically connected people were involved. The interview did not announce charges against a named person or publish a list of cases that would be opened. Its discussion of the future must therefore be read as an account of preparations and expectations, with operational announcements and case decisions still requiring their own confirmation.
The EPPO’s published mandate provides the starting point for understanding those questions. It investigates offences affecting the EU’s financial interests, including corruption linked to European funds, misappropriation and certain cross-border fraud. It is not a general authority for every allegation of wrongdoing in a member state. The connection between suspected conduct and European finances determines whether its powers are relevant.
That limit matters when political promises about recovering wealth become part of an election campaign. A promise to investigate cannot establish that an offence occurred. Nor can the size of a person’s fortune, on its own, explain where the money came from. A credible case needs an identifiable transaction, evidence of unlawful conduct and a legal basis for attributing responsibility. Those questions remain necessary even where the public strongly suspects favouritism.
Consider an EU-funded procurement project as an example of the problem prosecutors may need to examine. An unusually expensive contract could reflect poor planning, weak competition or deliberate manipulation. Establishing which explanation fits requires the tender documents, decisions, invoices and relevant communications. The difference between waste and criminal corruption cannot be resolved by treating every disappointing project as proof of a bribe. This is an illustration of investigative reasoning, not a description of a case announced in the interview.
Independence also has a practical meaning. Investigators need to be able to request records and test accounts that may be uncomfortable for the government that supports their institution. A new administration’s willingness to cooperate is useful, but durable safeguards must work when political incentives change. A prosecution system that depends entirely on the goodwill of current officeholders leaves the same underlying vulnerability in place.
Asset recovery creates another set of questions. Identifying property, restricting its disposal and obtaining a final decision about its ownership are separate matters. Public discussion often compresses them into a single promise to get money back. That shortcut can obscure the work needed to connect a particular asset to an offence and distinguish it from property belonging to someone else. Recovery should be judged through documented outcomes, with procedural rights preserved throughout.
For the Hungarian public, meaningful scrutiny of the transition would therefore involve more than counting announcements. Useful questions include whether operational arrangements are in place, whether prosecutors can obtain the necessary records and whether responsibilities between national and European bodies are clear. These are criteria for evaluating readiness. The interview’s reference to possible investigations next year should not be read as confirmation that all preparatory steps have already been completed.
There is a similar distinction between institutional access and the outcome of a particular case. Enabling prosecutors to work does not guarantee a conviction. It gives allegations a route to independent examination. A decision not to prosecute may also require explanation, especially where a case attracts political attention, but the test remains the evidence and applicable law. Political expectations cannot substitute for either.
Kövesi’s intervention makes the future relationship between Budapest and European prosecutors a question of conduct as well as formal membership. The next developments to watch are the practical arrangements that allow investigations to begin and any properly documented announcements from the competent authorities. The September interview sets out the stakes of that process. It leaves the merits of individual allegations to the investigative and judicial stages where they belong.
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